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Abstract
This paper proposes an explanation for why universal su¤rage has not
implied larger rich-to-poor transfers of wealth. In the presence of borrow-
ing constraints, if current taxation …nances (at least partially) policies that
redistribute future income, the poor, who are more likely to be liquidity con-
strained, may form a coalition with the rich and vote for low redistribution.
In this context, the e¤ects of an increase in income inequality on the level of
redistribution depend on whether the increase in inequality is concentrated
among the poor or the middle class. In the former case, an increase in in-
equality tends to decrease redistribution, whereas, in the latter case, it tends
to increase redistribution. Empirical evidence for a panel of OECD countries
provides support to our main thoretical implications. (JEL E62, H31)
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1. Introduction
Given existing inequality in income and wealth distribution, a natural question
arises as to why the relatively poor majority does not use its political power to
engage in larger redistribution and expropriation of the rich. If all citizens have
the vote, and median wealth is less than the mean (as it is in reality) a majority
of voters should prefer a tax rate of unity, fully redistributing all wealth to the
mean.
In presence of distortionary costs of taxation, full expropriation is irrational.
Yet, if the tax rate determined by majority voting is a decreasing function of the
median/mean wealth or income ratio, the question remains open of why extension
of su¤rage to the poorest segments of the population in the twentieth-century did
not bring about the feared large expropriation of the rich via the tax system in
western democracies.
Several explanations have been put forward to account for the fact that univer-
sal su¤rage has not implied larger rich-to-poor transfers of wealth.1 For instance,
it has been suggested that political systems are biased against the poor, who are
well known to participate less than the rich to political activity2. Also, if political
competition concerns more than one issue (e.g. tax policy and religion) the equi-
librium tax rate proposed by the party protecting the interests of the poor may
decrease, as the salience of the non-economic issue increases.3 Finally, it has been
pointed out that even people with below-average income will not support high
tax rates if they expect to move upward the income ladder or if they recognize
that there would be adverse dynamic e¤ects of expropriating the rich.4
An alternative way to pose the question is by asking why redistribution does
not appear to be higher in more unequal societies. Casual observation of cross-
country data shows that some of the most unequal countries of the world have
relatively small welfare states. Benabou’s [3] survey on inequality and growth
summarizes recent empirical work in this area and concludes that inequality is
not robustly associated with redistribution in cross-country data. In fact, the
1Putterman [14] reviews various explanations and tries to assess their degree of importance.
2For recent models developed along these lines, see Benabou [4] and Rodriguez [15].
3This argument has been recently advanced by Roemer [16].
4See Benabou and Ok [5] for a theoretical investigation of the former hypothesis. Perotti [11]
includes the dynamic e¤ects of current redistribution among the aspects evaluated by rational
voters.
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statistical association between inequality and various measures of redistribution
is rarely signi…cant and its sign, which is sometimes negative, heavily depends on
the chosen speci…cation. Rodriguez [15] obtains evidence of a negative association
between inequality and redistribution by examining a panel of OECD countries
in the period 1960-1990 and provides a theoretical model which is consistent with
it, based on the unequal political power of the rich and the poor. Saint-Paul and
Verdier [18] brie‡y discuss various theoretical arguments that can give rise to a
negative e¤ect of inequality on redistributive pressure.5 In particular, as shown
in Saint-Paul [17], an increase in inequality which a¤ects the bottom portion of
the income distribution may imply an increase in the median/mean income ratio
and therefore be associated with reduced taxation.
In this paper, we propose an alternative explanation for the non-expropriation
of the rich in democracies, which provides useful insights on the relationship
between inequality and redistribution and possible guidance in the speci…cation of
empirical tests of such relationship. The central idea of our work is the following.
We think of a world with credit market imperfections, where policies redistribute
income (at least partially) in the future and have to be …nanced with current
taxation. In this context, if agents vote over redistributive taxation, the median
voter is not necessarily the agent (class) with median income. The poor segments
of the population, who are more likely to be liquidity constrained, may vote for
low redistribution, together with the rich. In this case, instead of having all
agents below the mean voting for high redistribution, an ends-against-the-middle
equilibrium may arise where the poor and the rich form a coalition in favor of
low levels of redistribution.
Two observations are in order here. First, the type of policies we have in mind
may include purely redistributive expenditures (such as social security and health
expenditures), and expenditures that increase future labor productivity such as
public education, on-the-job training, and public investment in infrastructure.
Second, the choice of the method of …nancing is relevant in the political deter-
mination of government expenditures. We restrict the method of …nancing to
current taxation in order to focus on the role of liquidity constraints in the polit-
5Peltzman [10] also presents a theoretical explanation of why the political pressure for redis-
tribution should increase the more equal the distribution of income as well as empirical evidence
consistent with it.
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ical determination of redistribution.6
We formalize our main argument as follows. A two-period economy is inhab-
ited by individuals who are heterogeneous with respect to their …rst-period labor
productivity. In particular, we assume that there exist three income classes, the
rich, the middle class and the poor. First-period income is homogeneous within
classes and is below the mean for the two lowest income classes. Capital mar-
ket imperfections exist such that, to some extent, agents may be prevented from
borrowing as much as they should to carry out their optimal consumption plans.
Fiscal policy is politically determined through majority voting in the …rst period.
Such policy involves current proportional distortionary income taxation which
is used to …nance either future lump-sum redistribution or current government
expenditure, such as public investment in infrastructure and public expenditure
on education, which increases the future productivity of labor.
In this context, the preferred tax rate will be decreasing with …rst-period
income for agents who are not liquidity constrained, since the marginal cost of re-
distribution is higher for richer agents. Instead, the desired level of redistribution
will increase with …rst-period income for agents who are borrowing constrained.
The inability to borrow to …nance current consumption mitigates the incentives
to expropriate the rich for liquidity constrained agents, the more so the larger the
di¤erence between income and desired consumption in the …rst period.
This framework gives rise to di¤erent politico-economic equilibria, depending
on the extent of borrowing constraints. When borrowing ceilings are high and no
agent is liquidity constrained, the equilibrium tax rate will be the one preferred
by the middle class. As the extent of borrowing constraints increases, a coalition
of the poor and the rich is eventually formed, who favor a lower tax rate than
the one preferred by the middle class. In other words, as borrowing ceilings
fall, the identity of the median voter shifts from the middle class to the poor,
who are borrowing constrained and are induced to decrease current taxation to
increase current consumption. Since the e¢cient level of taxation is lower than
the unconstrained optimal level of taxation of the middle class, higher degrees of
borrowing constraints can be associated with higher levels of social welfare.
Our model has also interesting implications about the e¤ects of an increase
6Focusing on current taxation seems in line with the recent evolution of …scal policy in
industrialized countries. Balanced-budget requirements have been recently introduced in the
US. In Europe, the growth and stability pact strongly limits the possibility of debt …nancing.
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in income inequality on the level of redistribution. These e¤ects turn out to
depend on whether the increase in inequality is concentrated among the poor or
the middle class. In the former case, an increase in inequality tends to lower
redistribution, whereas, in the latter case, it tends to increase redistribution. It
is worthwhile noting that the former case contrasts with the conclusions of recent
theoretical studies (see, for example, Alesina and Rodrik [1], Benabou [3], Persson
and Tabellini [13]) which build upon the frawework of Meltzer and Richard [9]
and derive a positive relationship between inequality and redistribution.
In a recent paper, Saint-Paul [17] also obtains the result that more unequal
societies can redistribute less if the increase in inequality is concentrated on the
poorest. In his paper, the equilibrium tax rate decreases because the median
income increases relative to the mean. In our set up, the result depends crucially
on the change of identity of the median voter which is associated with higher
inequality.
In the last part of this paper we perform an empirical analysis based on our
theoretical implications about the relationship between income inequality and re-
distribution. Using pooled cross sectional-time series data for 22 OECD countries
between 1960 and 1990, we …nd evidence that, when proxies for borrowing con-
straints are included among regressors, the e¤ect of changes in income inequality
on redistributive expenditures (in particular, social security transfers and educa-
tion expenditures) is negative (positive) if inequality is concentrated on the poor
(middle) class. Our empirical results suggest that overlooking the role of borrow-
ing constraints may prevent empirical studies to detect a signi…cant association
between inequality and redistribution (as it happens, for example, in Perotti [12]
and in several papers surveyed by Benabou [3]).
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic features
of the model. In Section 3, we characterize the politico-economic equilibrium.
Section 4 studies the relationship between inequality and redistribution, which is
empirically analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. The model
We will consider a two-period small open economy where agents are indexed by
their …rst period endowment of human capital ei1. They belong to three income
classes (poor, middle class and rich) denoted by e11 < e
2
1 < e
3
1: The fraction of
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people in each class is given by ¹i with 0 < ¹i < :5 and
P3
i=1 ¹
i = 1: We will
assume that e21 < E1 and e
3
1 > E1 where E1 =
P3
i=1 ¹
iei1:
In their …rst period of life, agents allocate their income between consumption
and saving. The rate of return on savings is exogenous and equal to r. We assume
that in the …rst period agents cannot borrow more than Ã ¡ 1 times their income
to …nance current consumption. The parameter Ã ¸ 1 represents the degree of
capital markets imperfection. When Ã = 1; agents cannot borrow at all; when
Ã ! 1, there are no market imperfections.
Individual income in the second period is given by ei2 = AG1with A ¸ 1+r: We
can interpret G1 in two di¤erent ways. First, it may represent public expenditure
which increases the productivity of labor and is …nanced through proportional
income taxation in the …rst period. In this case we can think of public expenditure
on education and on-the-job-training or as public investment in infrastructure.7
Second, it may represent purely redistributive expenditure that takes place in the
second period, such as social security transfers.
We assume that there are convex costs of collecting taxes, so that if ¿ is
the tax rate, the actual revenue is
¡
¿ ¡ ¿2¢ E1. Balanced budget implies that
G1 =
¡
¿ ¡ ¿2¢E1.8 The level of taxation is determined in the …rst period through
majority voting. The tax rate which cannot lose under majority rule will be the
equilibrium tax rate.
Preferences are represented by the following intertemporal utility function:
U i = log ci1 + ¯ log c
i
2 (2.1)
where ¯ 2 (0; 1) denotes the intertemporal discount rate.
3. The politico-economic equilibrium
The politico-economic equilibrium is the solution of a two-stage maximization
problem. First, given the level of taxation, agents choose consumption to max-
7 In the former case, labor income in the second period may derive from a linear production
function of the form yi2 = e
i
2, where e
i
2 = A
¡
ei1
¢¹
Gº1 . For simplicity, we set ¹ = 0 and º = 1.
In the latter case, the production function would be yi2 = Ae
i
2
¡
KG2
¢º
where ei2 =
¡
ei1
¢¹
and
KG2 = G1 + (1¡ ±)KG1 , with ± = 1. In this case A = KG1 = 1 in the …rst period.
8Collection costs are introduced in order to avoid corner solutions for the endogenous tax
rate. An alternative (but analitically more complicated) way to avoid these solutions would be
to endogenize labor choices.
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imize their utility function given by equation (2.1) subject to the usual budget
constraints. Second, given the consumption functions obtained in the …rst stage,
agents choose the level of taxation which maximizes their indirect utility function.
The maximization problem in the …rst stage can be written as follows:
max
ci1;c
i
2
U i = log ci1 + ¯ log c
i
2
s:to ci1 = (1 ¡ ¿) ei1 ¡ si
ci2 = AG1 + s
i (1 + r)
ci1 · Ã (1 ¡ ¿) ei1
It is easy to verify that when the last constraint is not binding, the solution
to the utility maximation problem yields:
ci1 =
1
1 + ¯
h
(1 ¡ ¿) ei1 + ei2= (1 + r)
i
(3.1)
ci2 =
¯
1 + ¯
h
(1 + r) (1 ¡ ¿) ei1 + ei2
i
In the second stage, agents choose the tax rate to maximize their indirect utility,
obtained by substituting the optimal levels of consumption (3.1) in the utility
function (2.1). Thus, the most preferred tax rate for agent i is the solution to the
following problem:
¿ i = arg max
¿
³
log ci1 + ¯ log c
i
2
´
s:to ci1 =
1
1 + ¯
h
(1 ¡ ¿) ei1 + A
³
¿ ¡ ¿2
´
E1= (1 + r)
i
ci2 =
¯
1 + ¯
h
(1 + r) (1 ¡ ¿) ei1 + A
³
¿ ¡ ¿2
´
E1
i
The …rst order condition of this problem is:
¡ (1 + r) ei1 +
³
1 ¡ 2¿ i
´
AE1 = 0 (3.2)
which yields:
¿ i =
1
2
¡ (1 + r) e
i
1
2AE1
(3.3)
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where ¿ i > 0 , (1 + r) ei1 < AE1: A standard result in the literature on the
political economy of redistribution holds here: the richer is an agent, the lower is
her preferred tax rate.
Equation (3.3) represents the optimal tax rate for agent i if and only if, given
¿ i, agent i is not borrowing constrained. This requires that ci1 · Ã
¡
1 ¡ ¿ i¢ ei1.
This condition can be written as follows:
ei1 ¸
AE1
(1 + r) [2Ã (1 + ¯) ¡ 1] (3.4)
If this inequality is satisi…ed for all three groups, the optimal tax rate for the
middle class cannot lose under majority rule. Any tax rate lower than ¿2 will be
opposed by a coalition of groups 2 and 3, whereas any tax rate higher than ¿2
will be opposed by a coalition of groups 1 and 2. Thus we can write the following:
Proposition 1. Assume condition (3.4) holds for i = 1; 2; 3. Then, the equilib-
rium tax rate will be ¿2 with @¿
2
@e21
< 0:
As we just discussed, the tax rate given by equation (3.3) is the optimal policy
for agent i if and only if, given this level of taxation, agent i is not liquidity con-
strained. In the remaining of the paper, we will assume that ei1 <
AE1
(1+r)[1+2¯] for
i = 1; 2.9 This implies that, when the extent of liquidity constraints is su¢ciently
high, the borrowing constraint will be binding for the poor and the middle class.
In other words, there exists Ãi ´ £AE1 + (1 + r) ei1¤ = £2 (1 + ¯) (1 + r) ei1¤ > 1
such that if Ã < Ãi agent i will be liquidity constrained (notice that Ã1 > Ã2).
If this is the case, agent i chooses her preferred tax rate by solving the following
problem:
¿ ic = arg max
¿
³
log ci1 + ¯ log c
i
2
´
(3.5)
s:to ci1 = Ã (1 ¡ ¿ ) ei1
ci2 = (1 + r) (1 ¡ Ã) (1 ¡ ¿) ei1 + A
³
¿ ¡ ¿2
´
E1
9This simplifying assumption rules out the possibility that the rich become liquidity con-
strained and that political equilibria emerge where, for low levels of Ã; the rich prefer the
highest level of taxation and form a coalition with the middle class. However, our main results
would be unchanged if we dropped this assumption.
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The …rst order condition of this problem is given by:
¡1 ¡ ¯ (1 + r) (1 ¡ Ã) e
i
1 + AE1 (1 ¡ 2¿)
(1 + r) (1 ¡ Ã) ei1 + AE1¿
= 0 (3.6)
which yields:
¿ ic =
¯AE1 + (1 + ¯) (1 + r) (Ã ¡ 1) ei1
(1 + 2¯)AE1
(3.7)
We can now prove the following preliminary results:
Proposition 2. (1) @¿
ic
@Ã > 0 (2) ¿
ic · ¿ i (3) @¿ ic
@ei1
> 0 (4) When Ã = 1; ¿ ic > 0:
Proof. (1) Take derivative of equation (3.7) with respect to Ã. (2) When Ã = 1,
¿ ic < ¿ i , AE1 > (1 + 2¯) (1 + r) ei1 which we already assumed to hold. Since
@¿ ic
@Ã > 0 and ¿
ic = ¿ i when Ã = Ãi; this concludes the proof. (3) Take derivative
of equation (3.7) with respect to ei1. (4) Substitute Ã = 1 in equation (3.7).
Since redistribution takes place in the second period, the poor and the middle
class may hit the borrowing ceiling at their unconstrained optimal tax rate. In
this case, in order to relax the borrowing constraint, they will reduce their pre-
ferred level of taxation and increase the level of current consumption. The lower
is the extent of borrowing constraints, the higher is the desired degree of expro-
priation by the low-income classes. Contrary to the standard theoretical result
(illustrated for example by Meltzer and Richard [9]) of a negative relationship
between personal income and desired redistributive taxation, here the preferred
tax rate increases with income.10
Now, we can state the main result of this section:
Proposition 3. There exists a bÃ 2 hÃ2; Ã1i such that (1) for Ã 2 hbÃ;1i the
equilibrium tax rate is ¿2 (2) for Ã 2
h
1; bÃ´, the equilibrium tax rate is ¿1c < ¿2:
Proof. First, we know that at Ã2; ¿1c < ¿2(immediate: at Ã = Ã2; ¿2 = ¿2c >
¿1c): Next, we know that at Ã1; ¿1c = ¿1 > ¿2: Since @¿1c=@Ã > 0, there must
exist a bÃ 2 hÃ2; Ã1i such that ¿1c ³bÃ´ = ¿2: Thus, for Ã 2 hbÃ;Ã1i, preferred tax
10Clearly, the introduction of public debt may alter the most preferred tax rates in the presence
of liquidity constraints. However, it can be shown that the incentive to reduce the amount of
redistribution would still be present even if debt …nancing is allowed.
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rates are such that ¿3 < ¿2 < ¿1c and ¿2 cannot lose under majority rule. For
Ã 2
h
Ã1;1
i
, ¿3 < ¿2 < ¿1 and ¿2 cannot lose under majority rule. Thus for
Ã 2
hbÃ;1i, the equilibrium tax rate is constant. For Ã 2 hÃ2; bÃ´ ; ¿3 < ¿1c <
¿2 and ¿1c cannot lose under majority rule. For Ã 2
h
1; Ã2
´
; ¿3 < ¿1c < ¿2c and
¿1c cannot lose under majority rule.
The intuition for this result can be grasped by looking at Figure 1. As this
…gure shows, the identity of the median voter depends on the extent of borrowing
constraints. On the one hand, if the degree of borrowing constraints is low, that
is Ã > bÃ, the equilibrium tax rate is the optimal unconstrained tax rate for the
middle class ¿2 which lies between the preferred tax rates of the poor and the rich.
On the other hand, when borrowing constraints are strong enough (Ã < bÃ), the
preferred tax rate of the poor (who are now liquidity constrained) is su¢ciently
low for them to become the median voter. Thus, the change in the median voter
identity implies that the equilibrium tax rate is increasing with Ã:
Our model has interesting welfare implications. Let us consider the relation-
ship between the tax rate that arises in our politico-economic equilibrium and
the e¢cient tax rate. The e¢cient tax rate maximizes the present discounted
value of aggregate disposable income and is given by ¿¤ = 12 ¡ (1+r)2A : Clearly,
the relationship between the latter tax rate and the equilibrium tax rate depends
on the extent of borrowing constraints. In particular, we can show the following
result:
Proposition 4. The present discounted value of aggregate disposable income is
decreasing with Ã for Ã 2 [1;1) if and only if A < (1 + 2¯) (1 + r) :Otherwise, it
is increasing with Ã for Ã 2 [1; Ã¤) and decreasing with Ã for Ã 2 [Ã¤; 1], where
Ã¤ ¸ 1 is implicitly de…ned by ¿1c (Ã¤) = ¿¤.
Proof. The present discounted value of aggregate disposable income is a strictly
concave function of the tax rate and reaches a maximum for ¿ = ¿¤. If and only if
A < (1 + 2¯) (1 + r), the equilibrium tax rate is larger than ¿¤ for any value of Ã.
Otherwise, the equilibrium tax rate is below ¿¤ for any Ã < Ã¤. By Proposition
3 ¿ is monotonically increasing with Ã, which concludes the proof.
Notice that the level of welfare may increase as the extent of borrowing con-
straints increases. This result is due to the fact the existence of borrowing con-
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straints limits the incentives to vote for high levels of distortionary redistributive
taxation.
4. Income inequality and redistributive policies
So far, we have analyzed how the politico-economic equilibrium responds to
changes in the extent of borrowing constraints. Now, we want to investigate
how the equilibrium …scal policy changes when income distribution is altered. In
particular, we will study the relationship between redistributive policies and in-
come inequality. In order to do so, we will consider increases in the initial income
of the rich e31 coupled with decreases in the initial income of the poor e
1
1 or the
middle class e21. These modi…cations are assumed to leave the mean income E1
una¤ected.
As we will immediately see, these two distinct ways of increasing income
inequality have di¤erent implications on the equilibrium of the model. If we
begin with the case where the income of the poor is reduced, we can prove the
following result:
Proposition 5. Ceteris paribus, a mean-preserving reduction of e11 will decrease
(or leave una¤ected) the equilibrium tax rate.
Proof. Consider the graph in Figure 2. Following the change in the distribution
of income, Ã1 and bÃ move to the right. There is now a larger subset of Ã such that
the poor is the median voter. This subset is given by
hbÃ; bÃ0i : Within this subset,
¿1c < ¿2 . Since, for Ã < bÃ, the poor is still the median voter and ¿1c0 < ¿1c; this
concludes the proof.
The above result di¤ers from the conclusions of many recent theoretical studies
(see, for example, Alesina and Rodrik [1], Benabou [3], Persson and Tabellini [13])
which, along the lines of Meltzer and Richard [9], derived a positive relationship
between inequality and redistribution. Instead, our last proposition shows that,
if the increase in inequality is generated by a decrease in the income of the poor,
the degree of redistribution will actually decrease (or remain constant). The
intuition for this result can be illustrated by observation of Figure 2. For Ã < bÃ,
the poor is still the median voter and the equilibrium tax rate decreases because
the constrained optimal tax rate is increasing with income (see equation (3.7)).
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In the interval
·bÃ; bÃ0¸ ; the identity of the median voter changes from the middle
class to the poor and the equilibrium tax rate decreases. Finally, for Ã > bÃ0 the
middle class is still the median voter and the level of redistribution is unchanged.
If we now perform the same experiment with respect to the initial income of
the middle class, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 6. Ceteris paribus, a mean-preserving reduction of e21 will increase
(or leave una¤ected) the equilibrium tax rate.
Proof. Consider the graph in Figure 3. Following the change in the distribution
of income, Ã2 and bÃ move to the right. There is now a larger subset of Ã such
that the poor is the median voter. This subset is given by
hbÃ; bÃ0i : Within this
subset, ¿1c > ¿2: Moreover, for Ã > bÃ0, the middle class is still the median voter
and ¿ 2
0
> ¿2: This concludes the proof.
As the last result makes clear, when the increase in income inequality is caused
by a decrease in the income of the middle class, the e¤ect on the amount of redis-
tribution is the one which is usually predicted by the literature on the political
economy of redistribution. In this case, the higher is the inequality, the higher (or
constant) is the amount of redistribution. Let us consider Figure 3. For Ã < bÃ,
the poor is still the median voter and the equilibrium tax rate is unchanged. In
the interval
·bÃ; bÃ0¸ ; the identity of the median voter changes from the middle
class to the poor and the equilibrium tax rate increases. Notice that the preferred
tax rate of the middle class at lower income level is now higher than the preferred
tax rate by the poor. Finally, for Ã < bÃ0 the middle class is still the median voter
and the level of redistribution increases.
To summarize, the existence of borrowing constraints implies that the rela-
tionship between inequality and redistribution depends on which class is mostly
a¤ected by the income change. If the increase in inequality is concentrated among
the poor (middle class), redistribution tends to decrease (increase) in equilibrium.
Moreover, whether or not a given change of income distribution brings about a
change in the amount of redistribution depends on the extent of borrowing con-
straints.
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5. Empirical analysis
In this section we perform an empirical analysis based on the main theoretical
conclusions of our model. More speci…cally, we concentrate on the relationship
between income inequality and redistributive expenditure, as implied by Propo-
sition 3, 5 and 6.
According to these results, two elements should be taken into account in order
to investigate the association between inequality and redistribution. First, due
to the existence of borrowing constraints, the predicted sign of the relationship
depends on whether the increase in inequality is concentrated among the poor or
the middle class: in the former case, more inequality implies less redistribution,
while the opposite is true in the latter case. Second, the degree of borrowing
constraints determines the identity of the median voter and thus whether a change
in the income distribution a¤ects redistributive expenditure.
Our data set covers 22 OECD countries in the period 1960-1990. As a proxy
for the extent of borrowing constraints we use the maximum loan-to-value (LTV )
ratio for house purchases collected by Jappelli and Pagano [8] for the three periods
1961-1970, 1971-1980 and 1981-1987.11 Data on income distribution are taken by
Deininger and Squire [7]. As proxies for the income share of the poor and the
middle class, we use the share of income of the second quintile (SEC) and of the
third quintile (TH) . We choose observations as close as possible to the beginning
of the above subperiods. Finally, as proxies for redistributive expenditures we
use ten-year averages of social security transfers over GDP (SS) and government
expenditure on education over GDP (EDU) which we take from Rodriguez [15].
All remaining variables come from Barro and Lee [2]. Table 1 reports some
descriptive statistics for our data set. A detailed description of the data set can
also be found in the Appendix.
In order to test the main implications of our model, we specify the following
equations:
(G=Y )it = ®1 + X
0
it¯1 + °1SECit + ±1HBCit + ³1SHBCit + uit (5.1)
11See De Gregorio [6] for a discussion of di¤erent proxies for the extent of borrowing
constraints.
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(G=Y )it = ®2 + X
0
it¯2 + °2THit + ±2LBCit + ³2TLBCit + vit (5.2)
where i denotes country and t denotes time period, G=Y is the share of public
expenditure (social security or education) in GDP, X is a vector of conditioning
variables other than distributional variables, HBC (LBC) is a dummy variable
which proxies for high (low) borrowing constraints and takes value one when the
LTV ratio is above (below) a given threshold. Finally, the two interaction terms
SHBC and TLBC are de…ned as SEC ¤ HBC and TH ¤ LBC, respectively.
According to the results of Propositions 5 and 6, a reduction in the income
share of the poor (middle class) implies a decrease (increase) in the equilibrium
share of public expenditure in GDP if the degree of borrowing constraints is above
(below) a certain threshold. Otherwise, the change in income distribution will
leave the equilibrium level of redistribution una¤ected.
Therefore, the predicted sign of coe¢cients appearing in equations (5.1) and
(5.2) is °1 = °2 = 0, ³1 > 0 and ³2 < 0. Since we have no a priori indication on
the ”true” value of the threshold that we use to de…ne the high and low borrowing
constraints regimes, we select the one that yields the most signi…cant estimated
coe¢cient for interaction terms in the equations we estimate. This turns out to
be LTV = 70 when the dependent variable is EDU and LTV = 75 when the
dependent variable is SS; for both equations that we speci…ed.12
If the interaction terms are omitted from equations (5.1) and (5.2) (that is, if
the role of borrowing constraints in shaping the relationship between inequality
and redistribution is not taken into account), the estimated coe¢cients of distri-
bution variables are expected to decrease in absolute value and possibly become
insigni…cant. Moreover, the estimated coe¢cients of interaction terms should de-
crease (with respect to the interaction term coe¢cient) and possibly become in-
signi…cant as we move the threshold value de…ning borrowing constraints regimes
in either direction.13 In fact, according to our model, these experiments amount
12 Inspection of Figures 2 and 3 shows that, according to our theoretical results, the threshold
value used to de…ne high and low borrowing constraints regimes should turn out to be higher
when we consider variations of the poor’s income share (see equation (5.1)). The fact that this
implication of the model is not born out by empirical evidence might be due to the discrete
nature of data on borrowing constraints.
13 In particular, we will consider threshold values of LTV ranging from 65 to 80. This ensures
that dummy variables take value one for at least one fourth of the observations included in the
sample.
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to including irrelevant observations and/or exclude relevant observations in the
estimation of the (conditional) correlation between inequality and redistribution.
Tables 2 and 3 display estimation results obtained applying one-way (country
dummies) …xed (OLS) and random e¤ects (GLS) estimators to equations (5.1)
and (5.2), including or not interaction terms. Results from the random e¤ects
model are reported whenever the Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis
of no systematic di¤erence in coe¢cients estimates obtained by the two methods.
Conditioning variables include the log of GDP (LGDP ) and the log of pop-
ulation (LPOP ), to capture the notion that richer countries can a¤ord to redis-
tribute more income (Wagner’s Law) and the presence of economies of scale in
production of public goods. Moreover, the share of population over 65 years of
age (OLD) and the share of population below 15 years of age (Y OUNG) are used
in regressions with SS and EDU appearing as dependent variable respectively.
Estimation results provide encouraging evidence in favor of our theoretical
implications, especially as far as reductions in inequality are concentrated among
the poor. First, inspection of Table 2 shows that the estimated coe¢cients of
interaction terms have the predicted signs and are signi…cant at 5% con…dence
level in all equations. These coe¢cients decrease in absolute value and become
less signi…cant as we revise upwards and downwards the threshold value de…ning
borrowing constraints regimes (not shown). Second, the estimated coe¢cient of
SEC in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2 is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero. Third,
the estimated coe¢cient of SEC in columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 is lower than the
corresponding estimated coe¢cients of SHBC in Table 2.
When reductions in inequality are concentrated among the middle class, the
empirical results reported in Table 2 (columns 2 and 4) and Table 3 (columns 2
and 4) are less supportive of our implications, at …rst sight. Although there is
evidence that, in the low borrowing constraints regime, redistribution is negatively
associated with increases in TH (reduction in inequality concentrated among the
middle class), the latter seem to be positively associated with redistribution in
the high borrowing constraints regime. Instead, since the poor are median voter
in presence of high borrowing constraints, our model implies that the equilibrium
tax rate should not respond to mean-preserving increases in the income share of
the middle class, provided that the poor’s income share is una¤ected. This caveat
suggests one way of reconciling the above empirical results with the predictions of
our model. In particular, we argue that TH in equations 2 and 4 of Table 2 may
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be proxying for the omitted variable SEC. Inclusion of SEC among regressors in
equation (5.2) provides evidence in favor of this hypothesis, as shown in columns
5 and 6 of Table 2.
Robustness analysis conducted on the OLS (…xed e¤ects) estimates showed
that our empirical results are robust to various sources of misspeci…cation bias,
such as heteroschedasticity (Cook and Heisberg test), and outliers (robust regres-
sion). In particular, robust regression estimation tends to increase signi…cance of
coe¢cients. Moreover, an omitted test (RESET) shows that the null hypothesis
of no omitted variables is rejected (accepted) when interaction terms are omitted
(included).14
Summing up, our empirical analysis seems to support the idea that borrowing
constraints play a signi…cant role in shaping the relationship between inequality
and redistribution, by determining the identity of the median voter. The fact that
the role of borrowing constraints was so far overlooked might therefore provide a
possible explanation for why recent empirical studies on inequality and redistri-
bution (see for example Perotti [12] and the discussion in Benabou [3]) failed to
…nd evidence of a signi…cant association between these variables.
6. Conclusion
By incorporating capital market imperfections in a political economy model of
income redistribution, this paper provides an explanation for why the majority
of the population, whose income is below the mean, does not use its political
in‡uence to engage in large expropriation of the rich. Moreover, contrary to the
standard implications of the public choice analysis of the size of government, our
model shows that increasing inequality can be associated to reduced political
support for redistributive taxation.
Our model may add useful insights to the empirical analysis of the relationship
between income inequality and redistribution. As reported by Benabou [3], a
statistically signi…cant association between inequality and redistribution does not
emerge from available data. Following the main implications of our model, we
suggest that, in order to obtain better estimation results, it is important to specify
on which class the increase in income inequality is concentrated and to control
for the existence and extent of borrowing constraints. An empirical analysis
14Robustness testing results are available from the authors upon request.
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conducted along this direction using pooled cross sectional-time series data for
22 OECD countries between 1960-1990 lends support to our main theoretical
predictions.
17
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7. Appendix
List of countries
Our sample includes data for 22 countries in the period 1960-1990. Coun-
tries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
Description of variables and data sources
² EDU Ratio of nominal government expenditure on education to nominal
GDP (10-year averages). Source: UNESCO.
² LGDP Log value of real GDP per capita (1980 international prices). Source:
Barro and Lee [2].
² LPOP Log value of total population. Source: Barro and Lee [2].
² LTV Maximum loan-to-value ratio for the purchase of a house. Source
Jappelli and Pagano [8].
² OLD Population proportion over 65. Source: Luxembourg Income Study.
² SEC Share of income of the second quintile . Source: Deininger and Squire
[7].
² SS Social security transfers as a percentage of GDP (10-year averages).
Consists of bene…ts for sickness, old-age, family allowances, etc., social as-
sistance grants and welfare. Source: OECD, Historical Statistics.
² TH Share of income of the third quintile. Source: Deininger and Squire [7].
² YOUNG: Population proportion under 15 years. Source: Luxembourg
Income Study.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics: selected series
mean median max min st.dev. obs.
EDU 0.034 0.036 0.058 0.009 0.011 66
SS 0.130 0.123 0.265 0.042 0.049 54
SEC 0.185 0.191 0.248 0.095 0.035 53
TH 0.356 0.365 0.420 0.200 0.046 53
LTV 73.12 75 95 50 11.83 56
21
Table 2
Regression results for 22 OECD countries, 10-year averages 1960-1990
(1)a (2)a (3)a (4)b (5)a (6)b
EDU EDU SS SS EDU SS
C -0.64
(-4.66)*
-0.67
(-4.66)*
-1.85
(-3.41)*
-0.63
(-5.08)*
-0.64
(-4.70)*
-0.60
(-4.99)*
LGDP 0.01
(2.75)*
0.01
(2.56)*
0.04
(1.24)
0.05
(4.24)*
0.01
(3.18)*
0.06
(5.00)*
LPOP 0.05
(3.37)*
0.05
(3.23)*
0.15
(1.90)**
-0.01
(-0.64)
0.05
(3.07)*
-0.01
(-0.86)
YOUNG 0.13
(3.92)*
0.12
(3.73)*
0.14
(4.22)*
OLD 0.98
(2.27)*
1.37
(5.65)*
1.30
(5.57)*
SEC 0.01
(1.05)
-0.18
(-1.45)
0.14
(1.76)**
0.94
(2.28)*
TH 0.11
(2.51)*
0.37
(3.05)*
0.01
(0.03)
-0.39
(-1.10)
LBC 0.03
(2.11)*
0.17
(3.02)*
0.04
(2.29)*
0.18
(3.42)*
HBC -0.02
(-2.07)*
-0.09
(-2.98)*
SHBC 0.11
(2.08)*
0.63
(3.58)*
TLBC -0.10
(-2.11)*
-0.53
(-3.31)*
-0.10
(-2.28)*
-0.54
(-3.71)*
R2 0.82 0.81 0.91 0.60 0.84 0.63
obs. 46 46 40 40 46 40
a Estimation method: one-way (country dummies) …xed e¤ects by OLS. t-
statistics in parenthesis. * denotes signi…cance at 5% level, ** denotes signi…cance
at 10% level. b Estimation method: one-way (country dummies) random e¤ects
by GLS. z-statistics in parenthesis. * denotes signi…cance at 5% level, ** denotes
signi…cance at 10% level.
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Table 3a
Regression results for 22 OECD countries, 10-year averages 1960-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EDU EDU SS SS
C -.58 (-4.57)* -.57 (-4.39)* -1.95 (-3.39)* -1.98 (-3.37)*
LGDP .01 (1.68)** .01 (1.49) .01 (.17) .01 (.14)
LPOP .05 (3.90)* .05 (3.77)* .19 (2.64)* .19 (2.62)*
YOUNG .08 (2.70)* .07 (2.47)*
OLD .90 (2.30)* .91 (2.29)*
SEC .03 (1.72)** .19 (2.03)*
TH .01 (1.24) .14 (1.78)**
R2 .74 .73 .83 .83
obs. 53 53 44 44
a Estimation method: one-way (country dummies) …xed e¤ects by OLS. t-
statistics in parenthesis. * denotes signi…cance at 5% level, ** denotes signi…cance
at 10% level.
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